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This study examines the influences of corporate governance and firm 
characteristics on risk disclosure of Indonesian public listed 
companies. To address this study’s research questions and 
hypotheses, a total of 118 annual reports were analysed using the 
content analysis method. The Linsley and Shrives (2006) checklist 
items were adopted and extended to measure the extent of risk 
disclosure. The results show that the means of risk disclosure index 
is 32%. The statistical analysis shows that the size of the audit 
committee, the firm size, and financial performance are all positively 
related to the extent of risk disclosure.The implication of this finding 
suggests that corporate governance practices still do not sufficiently 
encourage firms to enhance risk disclosure This study provides 
insights into the current status of risk disclosure and the role of audit 
committees in enhancing risk disclosure practices in an emerging 
country. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Corporate risk refers to any opportunity or prospect, 
or any hazard, danger, harm, threat, or exposure, that 
has already impacted a company or that may impact 
a company in the future (Linsley and Shrives, 2006, 
p. 389). The recent global financial crisis has 
significantly reignited the debate and has triggered a 
regulatory response, in particular, regarding the 
effectiveness of corporate risk management and 
disclosure practices (Probohudono et al., 2012; Ntim 
et al., 2013). A skilful risk management can provide 
benefits to the company that prevent the occurrence 
of the risk and reduce the consequences of a loss. One 
of several important aspects of managing corporate 
risk is risk disclosure, which is an integral component 
of accountability (Allini et al., 2016).  
Corporate governance plays an important role in 
supporting companies in enhancing accountability, 
transparency, and clarity of risk disclosure. 
According to agency theory, risk disclosure is one 
mechanism to reduce information asymmetry 
between managers and stakeholders, mitigate agency 
problems, narrow the information gap, and improve 
the stewardship function (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Moumen et al., 2015). 
Also, communicating risk information to 
stakeholders can help a company manage changes, 
                                                          
1 In this study, the term ‘independent board of commissioners’ is used instead 
of ‘independent board of directors’. As stipulated in Indonesia’s Corporate 
Governance Code, the management of a limited liability company in Indonesia 
lower the cost of capital, determine its risk profile, 
estimate market value, and can serve as a guideline 
concerning the flow of business in the future (Beretta  
and Bozzolan, 2004; Abraham and Shrives, 2014; 
Elshandidy and Neri, 2015).  
Numerous academic studies have shown that 
the monitoring functions from corporate governance 
significantly affect the level of disclosure. 
Nevertheless, there is still very limited research 
concerning the influence of corporate governance on 
risk disclosure (Chang et al., 2014; Elshandidy  and  
Neri, 2015). Mostly, research on risk disclosure has 
been conducted in Western and developed countries 
(Amran et al., 2009; Al-Hadi et al., 2016). Current 
studies suggest that the relationship between 
corporate governance and voluntary disclosure is 
affected by country locations (Samaha et al., 2015). 
The present study addressed this gap by investigating 
the following research questions: (1) what is the 
extent of risk disclosure; and (2) whether corporate 
governance characteristics, including audit 
committees, an independent board of 
commissioners1, managerial ownership, and 
institutional ownership, affect risk disclosure. 
Indonesia represents an interesting case from an 
emerging country to explore the practice of risk 
disclosure. The Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX)/Bursa 
Efek Indonesia (BEI) requires listed companies to 
adopts a two-board system, namely, the Board of Commissioners and the Board 
of Directors. 
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disclose risk information in annual reports. The 
regulation of risk information disclosure is dictated 
in Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 60 
(revised 2014)/PSAK 60. In addition, the Indonesia 
Financial Services Authority/Otoritas Jasa Keuangan 
(OJK) has launched risk management regulations, 
namely, Regulation Number 17/2014, Number 
1/2015, and Number 18/2016. These regulations 
require that companies running their business 
activities in financial services, financial 
conglomerations, commercial banking, and non-
banking are required to implement the regulations. 
The results of this study offer insights into risk 
disclosure practices both theoretically and 
practically. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Agency theory has been widely used as a framework 
in explaining the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and voluntary risk disclosure 
(Allegrini and Greco, 2013). Agency theory suggests 
the existence of corporate governance as a 
mechanism of supervision within the firm, which can 
improve the quality and credibility of a company. For 
example, the existence of independent 
commissioners and an audit committee are expected 
to reduce agency conflicts arising as a result of the 
separation of objectives and interests between 
manager and shareholders. Companies with high 
agency costs are more likely to reduce them by 
implementing monitoring activities via corporate 
governance structures and voluntary disclosures 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Watts and Zimmerman, 
1983). 
The majority of previous risk disclosure studies 
have been conducted in Western and developed 
countries, such as the UK (Solomon et al., 2000; 
Linsley  and  Shrives, 2006); Italy (Beretta  and  
Bozzolan, 2004; Allini et al., 2016); Spain 
(Domínguez-Rodriguez  and  Noguera-Gámez, 2014; 
Hernández-Madrigal et al., 2015); Portugal (Oliveira et 
al., 2013); Japan (Mohobbot, 2005; Konishi and 
Mohobbot, 2007); and Australia (Taylor et al., 2010; 
Buckby et al., 2015). Abraham and Cox (2007) 
investigated the relationship between the quantity of 
narrative risk information in corporate annual 
reports of UK FTSE 100 companies. They found that 
corporate risk disclosure is negatively related to 
ownership by institutions. Also, the results showed 
that the number of executives and independent 
directors is positively related to the extent of 
corporate risk disclosure. More recently, Elzahar and 
Hussainey (2012) studied narrative risk disclosure in 
the interim reports of 72 companies in the UK. The 
results suggested that type of industry, size of 
company, and institutional ownership significantly 
influence the company's risk disclosure.  
Only a few previous empirical studies have been 
conducted in emerging countries (see, for example, 
Amran et al., 2009; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016). Hasan 
(2009) examined the extent of risk disclosure in 41 
companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). His 
results showed that risk disclosure is related with 
industry type, but firm size does not affect risk 
disclosure. Raemaekers et al. (2015) investigated risk 
disclosure practices after the implementation of the 
King Code on Corporate Governance (King III) by large 
firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE). Their findings suggest that, although there has 
been an increase in disclosure, however, the 
disclosure of risk is still just an exercise rather than 
an effective stakeholder communication. Mokhtar 
and Mellett (2013) documented the extent of 
mandatory and voluntary risk disclosure in the 
annual reports of Egyptian companies. They found 
that the size of the board and ownership 




3.1. Audit committee 
 
The audit committee is empowered to function, on 
behalf of the board of directors, by assuming an 
important oversight role in the corporate governance 
intended to protect investors and ensure corporate 
accountability (Rezaee et al., 2003, p. 536). 
International best practices suggest that the tasks of 
the audit committee primarily focus on financial 
reporting, internal and external auditing, and risk 
management (Indonesia Financial Services Authority 
(OJK), 2014). The size of the audit committee may 
play a significant role in the monitoring mechanism 
as it may provide a source of expertise and 
experience. Other audit committee members’ tasks 
include ensuring that decisions made by management 
are aligned with the shareholders’ goals. The 
committee is not only tasked with monitoring crucial 
information (Allegrini and Greco, 2013), but also 
preventing potential litigation and reputation risks 
faced by a firm (Zhang et al., 2007). Thus, it can 
increase the supervisory power of commissioners. 
The majority of past studies suggest that an audit 
committee is positively related with voluntary 
disclosure (Barako et al., 2006; Saha and Akte, 2013; 
Samaha et al., 2015). However, some studies do not 
find such an association (Mangena and Pike, 2005; 
Allegrini and Greco, 2013; Al-Maghzom et al., 2016). 
The present study expects that the audit committee 
plays a significant role in enhancing the quality of risk 
disclosures. 
H1: There is a positive association between the 
number of audit committee members and the extent 
of voluntary risk disclosure. 
 
3.2. Independent board of commissioners 
 
According to Article 108, paragraph 1, of the 
Indonesia Capital Market Law (1995), the Board of 
Commissioners (BoC) is responsible for supervising 
management policies, running the management in 
general with regard to both the company and the 
company’s business, and providing advice to the 
Board of Directors (BoD). In essence, the role of the 
BoC is to supervise and not to manage. The BoC sets 
the company’s strategic direction and determines the 
amount and type of risks. Commissioners who are 
independent can make a substantial contribution to 
important decisions. The presence of independent 
commissioners may give investors additional 
confidence concerning a company’s performance 
(Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK), 2014). 
Therefore, the appointment of independent 
commissioners will have a positive effect on a 
company.  
Empirical evidence shows mixed results 
regarding how independent commissioners influence 
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the level of corporate risk disclosure. Some prior 
studies found a positive relationship between 
independent commissioners and disclosure (Beasley 
et al., 2005; Abraham  and  Cox, 2007; Barakat  and  
Hussainey, 2013), while other studies found a 
negative relationship (Eng  and  Mak, 2003). However, 
some previous studies did not find any relationship 
(Haniffa  and  Cooke, 2002; Allegrini  and  Greco, 
2013; Domínguez-Rodriguez  and  Noguera-Gámez, 
2014; Hernández-Madrigal et al., 2015; Lundqvist, 
2015). Despite the mixed results, in accordance with 
agency theory, this study expects that independent 
commissioners are positively related with risk 
disclosure. The greater the independence of a 
commissioner, the better he or she will be in 
responding to stakeholders’ demands to provide a 
higher quality of risk disclosure. 
H2: There is a positive association between the 
presence of independent commissioners and the 
extent of voluntary risk disclosure. 
 
3.3. Institutional ownership 
 
Agency theory proposes that a larger number of 
shares owned by institutional shareholders will create 
a better monitoring mechanism from external parties. 
The greater monitoring is expected to reduce 
information asymmetry. In addition, the structure of 
ownership affects the level of supervision of the 
company, and therefore, it will affect the level of 
company disclosure. Barako et al. (2006) found a 
positive relationship between institutional ownership 
and voluntary disclosure in Kenyan companies. 
However, Saha and Akte (2013) did not find a 
significant relationship between institutional 
ownership and voluntary disclosure in Bangladeshi 
firms. 
H3: There is a positive association between 
institutional ownership and the extent of voluntary 
risk disclosure. 
 
3.4. Managerial ownership 
 
According to agency theory, companies that have a 
higher managerial ownership composition tend to 
reveal less information to shareholders. This is 
because the manager has a lower incentive to meet 
the demands of shareholders through a voluntary 
risk disclosure. Prior studies have documented the 
relationship between managerial ownership and risk 
disclosure. Probohudono et al. (2012) noted that 
managerial ownership is negatively related with the 
business risk of manufacturing companies. The 
higher proportion of managerial ownership in a firm 
may thus reduce the desire of companies to disclose 
risks (Miihkinen, 2012). However, Saha and Akte 
(2013) found a positive significant relationship 
between managerial ownership and voluntary 
disclosure in Bangladeshi firms. 
H4: There is a negative association between 
managerial ownership and the extent of voluntary 
risk disclosure. 
 
3.5. Firm size 
 
Most previous studies suggest that large firms are 
more likely to disclose information. Larger companies 
have more complexity in terms of their business 
cycles. As a consequence, large companies face higher 
business risks than smaller ones. Large companies 
tend to avoid taking on a high level of risk; therefore, 
larger company can increase investor confidence and 
reduce political sensitivity (Hasan, 2009). Also, larger 
firms have more stakeholders who would be 
interested in the performance of the company (Amran 
et al., 2009). Larger firm tend to increase the 
likelihood that the events that threaten the company 
would be different in terms of context, scope, and 
level (Beasley et al., 2005). The majority of the 
research evidence suggests that the relationship 
between the size of the company and voluntary risk 
disclosure is positive (Eng  and  Mak, 2003; Beasley et 
al., 2005; Barako et al., 2006; Linsley  and  Shrives, 
2006; Dobler et al., 2011; Miihkinen, 2012; Elshandidy 
et al., 2015; Al-Hadi et al., 2016).  
H5: There is a positive association between the 
size of the firm and the extent of voluntary risk 
disclosure. 
 
3.6. Financial performance 
 
Previous studies on voluntary disclosure in the 
literature note that the relationship between financial 
performance, which is proxied by a firm’s 
profitability, and risk disclosure is complex 
(Domínguez-Rodriguez  and  Noguera-Gámez, 2014). 
For example, several studies have documented the 
following mixed results: a positive relationship 
(Mohobbot, 2005; Amran et al., 2009; Taylor et al., 
2010; Ntim et al., 2013), a negative relationship 
(Elshandidy et al., 2015), and no significant 
relationship (Barako et al., 2006; Allegrini  and  Greco, 
2013; Martikainen et al., 2015). 
H6: There is a positive association between 
financial performance and the extent of voluntary 
risk disclosure. 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODS 
 
This study evaluated companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the period 
2013. A purposive sampling method was used with 
the criteria as follows: (1) the company published 
2013 annual reports; and (2) it has complete data 
related to risk information, its board, its audit 
committee, ownership, and other data. The data were 
obtained from the annual reports, the companies’ 
websites, and Bloomberg. Table 1 provides the 
sample selection. 
 
Table 1. Sample Selection 
 
Criteria  N 
Number of public listed companies in 2013 445 
Number of companies that did not disclose risk 
information 
(125) 
Number of companies that did not have managerial 
ownership data 
(202) 
Final sample 118 
 
This study employs a multivariate regression 
analysis, which is used to examine the influence of 
the independent variables on the dependent variable. 
This analysis also measures the strength of a 
relationship between these variables, and it shows the 
direction of the relationship. The regression equation 
is as follows:
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RDI = β0 + β1AC + β2INDEP + β3INSTI + β4MOWN + β5FIRM + β6FP +  ε 
 
where AC, audit committee, is measured by the 
number of members on the audit committee; INDEP, 
the proportion of independent commissioners, is 
measured by the number of independent 
commissioners divided by the total number of 
commissioners; INSTI, institutional ownership, is 
measured by the percentage of shares owned by an 
institution; MOWN, managerial ownership, is 
measured by the percentage of shares owned by a 
manager; FIRM, firm size, is measured by a logarithm 
of the total assets; and FP, financial performance, is 
proxied by profitability (earnings after tax divided by 
total assets).  
The dependent variable is measured by using 
the content analysis method with the unweighting 
disclosure index approach. The score will be 1 if the 
company disclosed information as determined in 
check list items, and 0 will be given if it is not 
disclosed. Table 2 provides the disclosure check list 
items as developed by referring to the Indonesia 
Financial Services Authority (OJK), Linsley and Shrives 
(2006), and Amran et al. (2009). 
 
Table 2. Disclosure Check List Items 
 
Risk category Risk details 
Financial risk (1) Interest rate, (2) Exchange rate, (3) Commodity, (4) Liquidity, and (5) Credit,  
Operational risk 
(6) Customer satisfaction, (7) Product, (8) Development, (9) Efficiency and 
performance, (10) Sourcing, (11) Stock obsolescence and shrinkage, (12) Product 
and service failure, (12) Environmental, Health and safety, (13) Brand name erosion, 
Empowerment risk 
(14) Leadership and management, (15) Outsourcing, (16) Performance incentives, 
(17) Change readiness, (18) Communication, 
Information processing and technology risk (19) Integrity, (20) Access, (21) Availability of infrastructure, 
Integrity risk 
(22) Risk-management policy, (23) Management and employee fraud, (24) Illegal 
acts, (25) Reputation, 
Strategic risk 
(26) Environmental scan, (27) Industry, (28) Business portfolio, (29) Competitors, 
(30) Pricing, (31) Valuation, (32) Planning, (33) Life cycle, (34) Performance 
measurement, (35) Regulatory, and (36) Sovereignty and political 
1 = if item disclosed; 0 = otherwise 
Risk disclosure index (RDI) = number of items disclosed by firm divided by total items (38 items)  
Source: OJK, Linsley and Shrives (2006), Amran et al. (2009)
 
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Based on the results of the descriptive statistics in 
Table 3, the risk disclosure index’s mean is 32%, with 
a minimum value of 13% and a maximum of 75%. This 
indicates that the extent of risk disclosure of public 
companies in Indonesia is still relatively low. With 
respect to the size of the audit committee, on average, 
firms have three members. This average just meets 
the minimum requirement mandated by 
the Indonesia Financial Services Authority (OJK).  
Article 4 of Regulation Number 55/2015 states 
that the audit committee must consist of at least 
three members who come from external parties of 
issuers or a public company. The average proportion 
of the independent board of commissioners in each 
company is 40%, which is larger than the minimum 
requirement mandated by the OJK. Article 20, 
Regulation Number 33/2014, states that the 
minimum proportion of independent commissioners 
is 30%. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
RDI 118 .13 .74 .32 .13 
AC 118 3.00 5.00 3.00 .32 
INDEP 118 .25 .75 .40 .11 
INSTI 118 .02 .83 .28 .14 
MOWN 118 .00 .74 .08 .14 
FIRM (Ln) 118 24.95 33.84 28.67 1.89 
FP 118 -.31 .44 .05 .29 
RDI = risk disclosure index; AC = audit committee; INDEP = independent commissioners; INSTI = institutional ownership; 
MOWN = managerial ownership; FIRM = firm size; FP = financial performance 
 
In terms of the proportion of institutional 
and managerial ownership, results of descriptive 
statistics show that the mean of stock ownership by 
institutions (28%) and managers (8%) is relatively low. 
Table 4 presents the results of the regression analysis 
of the determinants of risk disclosure. As explained 
above, the dependent variable in this study is risk 
disclosure, and the independent variables consist of  
audit committee size, the proportion of independent  
commissioners, institutional ownership, managerial 
ownership, size of the firm, and financial 
performance. The results of the analysis show that 
the regression model has no multicollinearity (VIF 
value less than 10) or heterocedasticity (the p-value 
of Glesier test is more than .05) problems.  
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Tolerance VIF t p-value 
Constant  -3.02 -3.94 .000   -1.028 .306 
AC + .097 2.480 .015 .940 1.063 .715 .476 
INDEP + .125 1.104 .272 .935 1.070 1.118 .266 
INSTI + .056 .606 .546 .757 1.320 1.047 .297 
MOWN - -.004 -.046 .963 .922 1.084 -.333 -.740 
FIRM + .016 2.022 .046 .950 1.053 1.653 .259 
FP + .027 2.174 .032 .833 1.200 1.387 .168 
R2 = .153; Adjusted R2 = .101; F = 2.920; p-value = .012; N = 118 
RDI = risk disclosure index; AC = audit committee; INDEP = independent commissioners; INSTI = institutional ownership;  
MOWN = managerial ownership; FIRM = firm size; FP = financial performance 
In general, the results of this study show that 
corporate governance and firm characteristics 
significantly positively affect the extent of risk 
disclosure. The results of the regression analysis 
indicate that audit committee size, firm size, and 
financial performance positively and significantly 
affect risk disclosure. Thus, hypotheses 1, 5, and 6 
are accepted. In contrast, the proportion of 
independent commissioners (H2), institutional 
ownership (H3), and managerial ownership (H4) did 
not have a significant influence on risk disclosure. 
Although the results are not significant, the direction 
of the relationship between such variables is 
consistent with the predicted hypotheses.  
The positive relationship between audit 
committee size and disclosure is consistent with 
Samaha et al. (2015), Saha and Akte (2013), and 
Barako et al. (2006). Although the Board of Directors 
(BoD) and the Board of Commissioners (BoC) are 
responsible for the financial statements’ integrity, 
the audit committee supervises the processes of 
corporate governance, such as external audits, 
financial statements, risk processes, and control. An 
effective audit committee may act as a tool to 
improve the effectiveness, responsibility, openness, 
and objectiveness of the BoC, as well as to improve 
the quality of financial statements. By supervising 
these processes, audit committee may create a 
climate of discipline and control that will reduce the 
possibility of misappropriation and enhance the 
viability and objectiveness of financial statements, as 
well as increase external stakeholder’s confidence 
and maintain the public's trust that the company has 
better internal controls. As the potential for risks is 
lowered, companies would be  encouraged to disclose 
the information to stakeholders. 
The insignificant relationship between 
independent commissioners and the extent of risk 
disclosure is consistent with Allegrini and Greco 
(2013) and Domínguez-Rodriguez and Noguera-
Gámez (2014). This finding indicates that a high 
proportion of independent commissioners in a 
company does not guarantee a high degree of risk 
disclosure. The existence of independent 
commissioners in Indonesia does not play a great role 
in encouraging companies to provide high risk 
disclosure. This result is due to the appointment of 
independent commissioners just for the sake of 
fulfilling the regulations instead of aiming to 
implement good corporate governance. In addition, 
the provisions mandating the minimum composition 
of independent commissioners (30%) is still too low 
to create independence of the BoC in decision 
making.  
This study finds that ownership type does not 
influence the extent of risk disclosure. This finding is 
consistent with Samaha et al. (2015). In Indonesia, the 
majority of institutional ownership is owned by the 
government, investment firms, securities companies, 
and pension funds. The insignificant relationship 
between institutional ownership and risk disclosure 
may be because investors have not yet fully 
considered risk information as important criteria in 
investing activity. Another possible reason is that 
firms tend not to disclose risk matters to avoid the 
negative impact on their business. Companies with 
high managerial ownership had less risk disclosure. 
This result may be that managers already have the 
information as they need; therefore, they tend not to 
disclose in order to reduce the costs of disclosure 
activity.  
Consistent with Linsley and Shrives (2006), 
Elshandidy and Neri (2015), and Amran et al. (2009), 
this study suggests that larger firms and firms that 
have a better financial performance tend to disclose 
more about risk. The larger the size of the firm, the 
greater pressure there is from shareholders and 
other stakeholders. Disclosing more risk information 
to principals will reduce the pressure. Companies 
that have a better financial performance will provide 
more risk information to shareholders and the public 
to reduce information asymmetry and to maintain 




This study investigated whether corporate 
governance and firm characteristcs are the 
determinants of risk disclosure. Corporate 
governance mechanism measures that used in this 
study are number of the audit committee members, 
the proportion of independent commissioners, 
managerial ownership and institutional ownership. 
Meanwhile, the firm characteristics variable is 
represented by firm size and financial performance. 
The results of our study provide evidence that audit 
committee, size of the firm and the company's 
financial performance are factors that encourage 
companies to communicate risk information in the 
annual reports. Overall, the results of this study 
support previous studies. Compared to the risk 
disclosure in developed countries, the level of risk 
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disclosure in Indonesia is still relatively low (32%).  
The result suggested that the existence of the 
Government’s regulation is still not fully 
implemented by listed companies.  
This study provides deeper insights into 
corporate governance’s role in encouraging public 
companies to better disclose risk information. The 
theoretical implication of the study is that corporate 
governance mechanisms are not yet fully successful 
in improving risk disclosure in companies’ annual 
reports. The practical implications of the results 
suggest that regulators need to continuously 
encourage companies to disclose more risk 
information in their annual reports. One way to 
achieve this objective is to set mandatory risk 
disclosures for public listed companies. Specifically, 
the types of risks that can greatly impact a company’s 
financial performance and a company’s going 
concern should be disclosed. 
This study has limitations. First, this study only 
used cross-section data, so the trend of risk 
disclosure cannot be observed from year to year. 
Second, the small sample may not be generalised in 
all settings. Third, the indicators for measuring the 
corporate governance variable are still limited to the 
size of the audit committee, the proportion of 
independent commissioners, and the type of 
ownership.  
Future research is expected to consider other 
measurements of corporate governance, such as the 
characteristics of the audit committee, to set a more 
comprehensive picture of corporate governance. 
Some other variables, such as the existence of a risk 
management committee, the role of government 
ownership, and the type of company (public vs. 
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